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THE (IN)ADMISSIBILITY OF FALSE CONFESSION EXPERT
TESTIMONY
David A. Perez
INTRODUCTION
In the early morning on April 20, 1989, two construction
workers were walking through New York City's Central Park when
they stumbled across the writhing body of Trisha Meili, who had
been left for dead in a shallow ravine near 102nd Street.' The crime
set off a firestorm in the District Attorney's office and soon enough
the police did not just have one suspect, they had five: a group of
teenagers from Harlem, all of whom were either Black or Hispanic.2
They were accused of beating and raping the twenty-eight year old
investment banker.3 On April 21, after the suspects had been awake
for about two days, one by one they began confessing on videotape to
the vicious assault.4 During the trials the confessions were particular-
ly important since no physical evidence linked any of the suspects to
the crime.s Nevertheless, each was convicted and sentenced to prison
. Yale Law School, J.D., 2010. A special thanks to Eric Sandberg-Zakian and Elvira Castil-
lo, who provided invaluable comments, insights, and suggestions from beginning to end.
The author would also like to thank the editors of the Touro Law Review for their guidance
during the publication process.
1 Chris Smith, Central Park Revisited, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2002,
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/crimelaw/features/n 7836.
2 Id.
4 id
5 Id.
[T]he confessions grew in importance as forensic evidence failed to ma-
terialize. No blood or DNA tests tied the five to the jogger. Hairs found
on Richardson's clothes were said to be "consistent" with those of the
jogger, but it was precious little residue considering that five people
were accused of beating and raping a woman in a muddy ravine.
23
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terms ranging from five to thirteen years.6 The only problem was
that the suspects were innocent, and the real perpetrator was Matias
Reyes, who pled guilty in 1991 to four other rapes, and in 2002 con-
firmed that it was he who attacked Ms. Meili in Central Park that
night.7  The detailed and sordid statements that the teenagers pro-
vided to police officers must have been false.'
This Comment discusses the relationship between police in-
terrogation tactics and false confessions in order to address the ad-
missibility of false confession expert testimony, a question that has
traditionally been left to the discretion of the trial judge.9 The current
literature-indeed, the prevailing consensus-argues for drastic
changes to police interrogation practices to prevent false confessions
and, in combination with such changes, demands that expert testimo-
ny on false confessions be admitted in criminal trials. Despite the
relative unanimity in the literature, state and federal courts remain
bitterly divided on the question of admissibility of false confession
expert testimony. Each decision in this judicial split has gone one of
four ways: some courts only admit expert testimony that discusses a
particular defendant's mental condition;10 others limit the discussion
to a general description of the phenomenon;" still others permit a
Id.
6 Smith, supra note 1.
Id.
See Elaine Cassel, The False Confessions in the Central Park Jogger Case: How They
Happened and How to Stop Similar Injustices in the Future, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 21, 2002,
http://www.counterpunch.org/cassell221.html.
9 Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards,
and the Role ofExpert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 196 (2005).
10 See United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 1995) (permitting appropriate ex-
pert testimony pertaining to truthful character); United States v. Raposo, No. 98 CR. 185
(DAB), 1998 WL 879723, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1998) (permitting a false confession ex-
pert to broadly testify on "both the falsity and the voluntariness of Defendant's statement");
State v. Caulley, No. 97AP-1590, 2002 WL 392191, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002)
(allowing Dr. Ofshe to testify about the strong likelihood of a false confession); State v.
Stackhouse, No. 18984-8-III, 2001 WL 1497217, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001)
(permitting expert testimony regarding false confessions only if " 'reasonable medical cer-
tainty' " exists).
11 See United States v. Belyea, 159 F. App'x 525, 530 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that expert
testimony stating that false confessions exist and explaining what techniques can induce
them would be helpful clarification); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (7th Cir.
1996) (permitting Dr. Ofshe to testify about false confessions and their relevance to provide
the jury with relevant information); People v. Page, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(permitting expert testimony to educate the jury on false confessions and the factors that
might influence them); Boyer v. State, 825 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (hold-
24 [Vol. 26
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particularized discussion of the elements of a false confession present
in the suspect's confession;12 and finally, many other courts at the
state and federal level simply exclude this kind of testimony, whether
or not it discusses a cognizable mental condition, the false confession
phenomenon in general, or a particularized application of the false
confession theory.13
This Comment begins by conceding that there are proven and
documented cases where false confessions have led to wrongful con-
victions of innocent persons. However, a review of the empirical re-
search demonstrates that false confessions are exceedingly rare and
that the evidence upon which the leading false confession scholars
rely on is very unreliable. 14  The rarity of false confessions under-
mines the attack on current police interrogation practices, while the
unreliability of the empirical research suggests that expert testimony
on false confessions should not be admissible. Therefore, this Com-
ment rejects the argument that, in light of the false confession phe-
nomenon, we must overhaul our criminal justice system and admit
false confession expert testimony. Part I provides a brief exposition
ing that Dr. Ofshe's testimony about false confessions was improperly excluded on the issue
of voluntariness).
12 See Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 774 (Ind. 2002) (holding that the Dr. Ofshe's tes-
timony would have been helpful to the jury, barring any opinion regarding truth or falsity);
People v. Hamilton, 415 N.W.2d 653, 668-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (condoning expert psy-
chological testimony, but holding that expert opinions regarding truthfulness are inadmissi-
ble); State v. Buechler, 572 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Neb. 1998) (holding that expert testimony that
does not tell the jury how to decide, but rather explains the situation, is admissible in order
to educate the jury); Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (Va. 2002) (ruling
that expert testimony is admissible, but that an expert cannot express an opinion as to the
veracity of the confession).
13 See United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that expert
testimony regarding credibility should be excluded because it is prejudicial and unduly in-
fluences the jury); Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is the exclu-
sive province of the jury to determine the believability of the witness. (citations omitted) An
expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of a victim's
story."); Vent v. State, 67 P.3d 661, 670 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding that expert testi-
mony on the subject of false confessions can be unreliable and therefore inadmissible); State
v. Cobb, 43 P.3d 855, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that expert testimony of false con-
fessions "invades the province of the jury"); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603, 609 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that the common knowledge of the jury regarding false confessions was
reasonable and unaided by expert opinions); People v. Philips, 692 N.Y.S.2d 915, 939-940
(Sup. Ct. 1999) (finding that a " 'voluntariness' expert witness" was not accepted by the
scientific community and too novel to be admissible).
14 See generally Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implica-
tions, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 332, 333 (2009) (explaining the defects and difficulties
of false confessions research).
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on the phenomenon of false confessions. Part II discusses the current
jurisprudence on the admissibility of expert testimony in general, and
false confession expert testimony in particular. Part III then ad-
dresses the theoretical and practical problems of admitting false con-
fession expert testimony. Part IV discusses the false confession criti-
que of police interrogation, and offers a defense of certain police
interrogation tactics that false confession theorists indict.
I. THE FALSE CONFESSION PHENOMENON
Although the concept of a false confession dates back centu-
ries, major academic research on the topic began in earnest during the
1980s when Saul Kassin and Lawrence Wrightsman began their pio-
neering research.' 5 Kassin and Wrightsman identify three categories
of false confessions: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced in-
ternalized.16 A voluntary false confession involves a suspect who
"confesses in the absence of external pressure."' 7  A coerced-
compliant false confession is given by a suspect in order to escape
from a particularly onerous and adverse interrogation, to secure a
promised benefit (e.g. a favorable plea), or [to] avoid a threatened
harm (e.g. violence, intimidation, jail time).' 8 A coerced-internalized
false confession, the rarest form of false self-inculpation, involves an
innocent suspect who actually believes that he or she is guilty.'9
Since the mid-1990s, Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo have
been the leading false confession researchers. While generally ac-
cepting Kassin and Wrightsman's triple-pronged framework, Ofshe
and Leo have created their own four-part false confession typology:
stress-complaint, coerced-compliant, non-coerced persuaded, and
coerced persuaded.20 Stress-complaint false confessions are the re-
15 See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock Ju-
ror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 133 (1980) (testing the Supreme Court's assump-
tion that jurors discount a coerced confession as unreliable); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67-94 (1985).
16 Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Keichel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 125 (1996).
17 Id.
1 Id. See also Soree, supra note 9, at 198 (explaining that such a response is usually
prompted by threats or promises).
19 Kassin & Keichel, supra, note 16, at 125; see also RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 199 (2008) (discussing Kassin's typology).
20 Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
26 [Vol. 26
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sult of the "inherent stressors" in a normal interrogation, which in-
clude an unfamiliar setting, a loss of control, emotional distress, and
an accusatorial atmosphere. 2 1 As a result, the suspect may become
confused, exhausted, and emotionally unstable, and to escape from
these rather unavoidable stressors, he will confess to a crime he did
not commit.22 In this way stress-compliant false confessions mirror a
subset of Kassin and Wrightsman's coerced-compliant false confes-
sions.
Leo and Ofshe's version of coerced-complaint false confes-
sions results from classically coercive police interrogation tactics
such as the use of threats, promises of leniency, as well as other
forms of physical and psychological manipulation. 23 Like Kassin's
rendering of coerced-compliant false confessions, Ofshe and Leo's
version postulates that an otherwise innocent suspect, in order to se-
cure a promise or to avoid a threat, will confess.
Finally, Ofshe and Leo argue that the "underlying psycholog-
ical process" causing Kassin's coerced-internalized false confessions
is persuasion rather than internalization, "and have thus renamed this
category coerced-persuaded false confessions." 24  Persuaded false
confessions occur when an interrogator persuades an innocent sus-
pect that he committed the crime of which he is accused.25 "Both
types of 'persuaded' false confessions . . . are given after a person has
become convinced that it is more likely than not that he committed
the crime, despite possessing no memory of having done so." 26 The
non-coerced version results from a relatively normal police interroga-
tion, while the coerced version results from the same tactics used to
procure a coerced-compliant false confession, namely threats and
promises of leniency.27 Persuaded false confessions-whether they
are coerced or non-coerced-are extremely rare and difficult to detect
because they are usually unintended and unrecognized by the interro-
gators.28
and Irrational Action, 74 DENv. U. L. Rev. 979, 997 (1997).
21 Id
22 Id. at 998.
23 Id at 998-99.
24 Leo, supra note 19, at 200.
25 Id. at 210.
26 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 20, at 999.
27 Id
28 id
20 10] 27
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There are three stages to a persuaded false confession. First,
the interrogator plants the seeds of doubt in the suspect's belief that
he is innocent, causing the suspect to second-guess himself.29 In con-
trast to a coerced-compliant confession, the confusion generated by
this tactic places the suspect in a state of memory limbo, making the
suspect unsure about whether he committed the crime or not.
Second, the interrogator explains away the memory loss either by
claiming it was repressed, or by suggesting the suspect must have ex-
perienced some sort of blackout.30 Finally, the interrogator attempts
to craft a post-admission narrative to corroborate the confession.
Typically he does this by supplying the suspect with details consis-
tent with the crime scene and subsequent investigation.32 Like Kas-
sin, Ofshe and Leo emphasize that this is an extremely uncommon
phenomenon that tends to occur only after a series of unusually leng-
thy and psychologically intense interrogations.33
Two additional observations should be mentioned. First, false
confession theorists note that the reactions of a guilty person differ
from that of an innocent suspect when confronted with the allegation
of a crime.34 A guilty party is "insulated from shock because he has
always been aware of possible detection," while an innocent person
remains confused that he is a suspect.35 Second, they emphasize the
importance of a post-admission narrative, which consists of the cor-
roborating details given after a suspect has confessed.36 A simple
admission of "I did it" is worth relatively little if it is neither sup-
ported by external evidence nor buttressed by a post-admission narra-
tive that is consistent with the facts of the case. Assuming the inter-
rogators do not craft the post-admission narrative for the suspect,
Professors Leo and Ofshe claim that by comparing the post-
admission narrative to the facts of the case, one might determine the
veracity of a particular confession.3 1 It is self-evident that a guilty
person can prove his accurate knowledge of the crime; however, an
29 Id. at 1107.
30 id.
3' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 20, at 990-9 1.
32 Id. at 991-92.
33Id. at 1117.
34 Id. at 989.
SId.
36 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 20, at 991-92.
3 Id. at 993.
28 [Vol. 26
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innocent person cannot prove his ignorance. A good fit between the
post-admission narrative and the crime is strong evidence of guilt. A
poor fit is, at best, consistent with innocence, but does not dispose of
the inquiry. Nevertheless, the post-admission narrative test is a criti-
cal component of the false confession theorists' claims that their me-
thodology can help detect false confessions.
Courts have been terribly divided over the admissibility of
this typology as expert testimony for over two decades. Part II be-
gins with an overview of the admissibility of confessions, and of ex-
pert testimony in general. Part III then shifts to a discussion about
the lower courts' divide over the admissibility of false confession ex-
pert testimony.
II. CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Historic Safeguards Against Unreliable
Confessions
Historically, confessions were excluded only when they were
deemed unreliable,38 a rule that stretches back to eighteenth century
common law. 39 By the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court began challenging the notion that innocent people never incri-
minate themselves.40 Confessions extracted from particularly abusive
interrogations began to forfeit some of their presumptive weight in
court.4' In 1936, the Supreme Court turned to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and ruled for the first time that
a confession was involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, when po-
lice use violence during an interrogation.4 2 The key question was
whether the confession was trustworthy-a concept that has since
become synonymous with reliability. This common law standard
remained relatively untouched until the mid-1960s, when Massiah v.
United States43 and Miranda v. Arizona" provided a constitutional
38 Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrust-
worthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 111-12 (1997).
3 The King v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-236 (K.B.).
40 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
41 id.
42 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
43 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2010] 29
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basis to exclude confessions based upon certain police interrogation
tactics. 45 The first question to determine whether a confession is ad-
missible under Miranda is whether a suspect was informed of his
specific rights-was he Mirandized?46 The next inquiry is whether
the suspect invoked his right to not speak at all, or the right to speak
only with an attorney present.47 Finally, the court must ask whether
the defendant voluntarily waived those rights.48 Although Miranda is
seemingly under a perpetual siege by legal scholars who believe it is
too weak, it nevertheless protects suspects by employing a strong ex-
clusionary rule that bars the admission of confessions given during a
police interrogation that fails to meet Miranda's precepts.49
In Massiah, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right
to counsel is violated if, after suspects have been indicted, the police
solicit inculpatory statements from them without their attorney
present. Massiah was later expanded in Brewer v. Williams1 to ap-
ply once adversarial proceedings have been initiated against the sus-
pect, but not during the custodial interrogations that take place before
an indictment is secured.52 Miranda, however, applies to all interro-
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45 White, supra note 38, at 113 ("[D]uring the mid-1960s, Messiah ... and ... Miranda
... provided new constitutional bases for excluding confessions obtained as a result of po-
lice interrogation.").
46 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981) (determining that in order for an in-
terrogation to be constitutional, the putative defendant must be told of his "right to remain
silent" and his right to an attorney before the interrogation begins (citing Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 473-74)).
47 Id. at 481 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
48 White, supra note 38, at 114 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); see also North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371-72 (1979) (discussing a suspect's voluntary and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda rights).
49 See Nathan L. Burrow, A Patane in the Neck: Should Mississippi Suppress Physical
Evidence Discovered Pursuant to Miranda Violations As Fruits of the Poisonous Tree?, 77
Miss. L.J. 1141, 1157 (2008) ("The exclusionary remedy is triggered whenever a suspect is
subjected to coercive interrogation methods, and Miranda furthers this end by affording a
presumption of coercion where a suspect is questioned without being advised of his rights."
(citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639-40 (2004))). In fact, the Miranda Court
spends a considerable amount of time discussing a variety of police tactics that could take a
heavy toll on individual liberty. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-58.
o Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
s' 430 U.S. 387, 398, 404 (1977).
52 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2579 (2008) (ruling that for purposes of
attaching the right to counsel, adversarial proceedings begin when the criminal defendant
initially appears before a magistrate judge, where he learns of the charges against him and
his liberty is subject to restriction).
30 [Vol. 26
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gations, whether adversarial proceedings have begun or not.13 After
Brown v. Mississippi,54 the most important factor upon which the
Court focused when determining the admissibility of a confession
was its reliability." Confessions became less reliable in those in-
stances where inhumane interrogation procedures were used-
including violence and the "third degree."
After more than twenty years, the Supreme Court applied Mi-
randa to false confessions in Colorado v. Connelly.s" Connelly ap-
proached a Denver police officer and confessed to a murder." Both
the officer and the detective called to the scene informed Connelly of
his Miranda rights, and he insisted that he understood them.59 After
providing grisly details of the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young
girl whom he claimed he had killed a year earlier, Connelly took the
officers to the exact scene of the crime. 60 The entire time he was
providing these statements Connelly appeared normal and lucid, and
was under little to no pressure from the policemen accompanying
him.61 The next day however, he became "visibly disoriented" dur-
ing an interview with the public defender assigned to his case. 62 Af-
ter an evaluation in the state hospital, Dr. Jeffrey Metzner, a psy-
chiatrist, determined that Connolly was suffering from chronic
schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state, at least as of the day be-
fore he confessed. 63 Connolly claimed that the voice of God had giv-
en him a choice: confess to the murder or commit suicide.' 4 Accor-
dingly, the defense moved to suppress all of his statements. 5 Dr.
Metzner testified at the suppression hearing that the psychosis moti-
vated his confession, and therefore, impaired his cognitive abilities to
5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
54 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
5 See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
POLICY 20 (1980); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too
Far?, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1168, 1173 (2001).
56 Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
7 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 160.
59 Id
6o Id. at 160-61.
61 Id. at 161.
62 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161.
6 Id. at 161.
64Id.
65 Id. at 162.
2010] 31
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understand his Miranda waiver.66 Although concluding that the po-
lice interrogators had done nothing wrong, the Colorado courts ruled
that the confession was involuntary and suppressed Connolly's
statements.67 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that voluntariness, under the Fifth Amendment, depends upon "the
absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader
sense of the" term. 68  While noting that a defendant's mental condi-
tion may be relevant, the Court rejected the notion that a particular
mental condition-absent police misconduct--could be dispositive
when determining a confession's voluntariness. 69  Indeed, this was
hardly surprising since the Court has consistently focused on police
misconduct when determining voluntariness since the 1940s.m
Although Connolly was a natural extension of the Court's his-
torical focus on police misconduct, for the first time the Court sepa-
rated the analytically distinct concepts of voluntariness and reliabili-
ty.7n The former, from that point forward, remained a matter of law
to be determined by a judge, while the latter remained a matter of fact
to be considered by a jury. This becomes a critical distinction when
determining the admissibility of expert testimony on false confes-
sions. For example, in some cases the testimony may touch upon is-
sues of voluntariness and may only be properly introduced during a
66 id
67 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 162.
61 Id at 169-70.
69 Id. at 170-71.
70 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-402 (1978) (holding that a confession
is excludable where the defendant is subjected to a long interrogation while incapacitated
and sedated in an intensive-care unit); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 519-21
(1968) (observing that defendant had been interrogated for over eighteen hours without food
or sleep); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (excluding a confession obtained af-
ter a police officer held a gun to defendant's head); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737,
743, 745-46 (1966) (subjecting the defendant to sixteen days of incommunicado isolation
within a windowless cell, repeated interrogations, and limited food); Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 625 (1961) (labeling police tactic of interrogating defendant nonstop for
five days as "coercive"); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1961) (excluding confession
where defendant was held for four days with inadequate food and medical attention); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (rejecting confession where defendant had been held
incommunicado for three days with little food and where police threatened defendant with a
lynch mob); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1944) (noting that defendant had
been kept awake for thirty-six hours during interrogations).
n1 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687 (1986) (holding that "evidence bearing on the
voluntariness of a confession and evidence bearing on its credibility fall in conceptually dis-
tinct and mutually exclusive categories").
32 [Vol. 26
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suppression hearing as a question of law for a judge or judicial pan-
el. 72 In other cases, however, the testimony may question the reliabil-
ity of the confession and is properly an issue for the trial itself.7
This Comment concerns itself with the latter, the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony during trial, and therefore focuses on that testimony
which necessarily implicates the reliability of a particular confession.
B. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admis-
sibility of expert testimony, and is based on the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 74 Rule 702
places limits on the admissibility of expert testimony purportedly
based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
The judge's task is to ensure that the testimony is both reliable and
assists " 'the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.' "76 The reliability of an expert's testimony can be re-
vealed through his methodology, while the relevance is made known
by determining whether the testimony will assist the jury as the trier
of fact. The testimony will fall under the definition of "scientific" if
it has grounding in the methods and procedures of science.77 This re-
quirement relates to the testimony's relevance by requiring a valid
and topical connection to the issue in question. Put differently, the
testimony must "fit" the case at hand, a consideration that is not al-
ways obvious. Additionally, the subject of the expert's testimony
must be "scientific . . . knowledge." 7 9 To be "scientific" implies that
the testimony is grounded in scientific methods and procedures,
while "knowledge" connotes more than simply subjective belief or
unsupported speculation, but rather a body of known facts or ideas
accepted as true.80 The Daubert Court adopted a method-based ap-
72 id.
7 Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 855 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (Mass. 2006) (eva-
luating the reliability of the confession).
74 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7 Id. at 589-90.
76 United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
77 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
78 Id. at 591.
7 Id. at 589-90.
so Id. at 590.
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proach to determine whether particular testimony qualified as "scien-
tific knowledge," but also pointed out that Rule 702 applies equally
to "technical, or other specialized knowledge" as well."
Rule 104(a),82 also mandates that once a party has proffered
expert testimony, the trial judge must determine whether (1) the tes-
timony is based upon scientific knowledge, and (2) whether it will
assist the jury in the trier of fact.83  To do so, the trial judge first
makes a preliminary assessment of the testimony's scientific quali-
ties-or lack thereof-and whether it can properly be applied to the
facts at issue. A court may exclude or limit testimony if it is prejudi-
cial, misleading, wasteful, confusing, or its cumulative negative im-
pacts outweigh its probative values. 84 There are a number of assess-
ments that will influence the judge's decision calculus, including: (1)
whether the theory can be empirically tested; (2) whether this testing
has revealed the known or potential error rate of the theory; (3)
whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication;
and (4) whether the theory has been widely accepted within its re-
spective field or community. 85
The key is not the conclusions generated by the theory, but ra-
ther the methodology and principles upon which they rest. To find
out whether an expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact, a court
must decide whether an untrained layperson would be qualified to de-
termine intelligently a resolution to the particular issue without the
help from those having more specialized knowledge of the matter.8 6
Ultimately, Daubert had two main holdings. First, that the
"general acceptance test" articulated in Frye v. United States is not a
necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence. Second, that the rules give the
8 Id. at 590, n.8.
82 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of ... a wit-
ness ... shall be determined by the court . . . ."); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (determining that admission may be established by a preponderance of
proof).
83 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
8 Shay, 57 F.3d at 134.
85 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
86 Shay, 57 F.3d at 132.
87 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89; but see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) (excluding expert testimony because the scientific procedure upon which the tes-
timony relied was not "sufficiently established to have gained-general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.").
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trial judge the responsibility of determining whether the expert's tes-
timony is both reliable and relevant before allowing it to enter the
record. 8 In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
extended the Daubert standards to include all expert testimony,
whether it is "scientific knowledge," "technical knowledge," or "spe-
cialized knowledge." 89 A preliminary assessment must then be made
by the trial court to determine whether the reasoning and methodolo-
gy are valid and whether they can be properly applied to the facts in
issue.90 A similar analysis is to be done when the testimony is prof-
fered as "technical" knowledge. That said, even if the general field
itself has qualified for expert testimony, the specific testimony prof-
fered might not be based on an expert's special skills:
An expert's opinion is helpful only to the extent the
expert draws on some special skill, knowledge, or ex-
perience to formulate [his] opinion; the opinion must
be an expert opinion (that is, an opinion informed by
the witness's expertise) rather than simply an opinion
broached by a purported expert.91
Four years after Daubert, the Supreme Court clarified that the deci-
sion of a trial judge to exclude or admit expert testimony under Rule
702 can only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.92
C. A Nation Divided: The Admissibility of False
Confession Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Court
The admissibility of false confession expert testimony has not
been addressed by the Supreme Court, despite the contentious debate
being played out on all levels of state and federal courts. 93 One rea-
son the Court has explicitly avoided this issue might involve the rela-
tive infancy of serious false confession research. The Court may
88 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
89 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
90 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
91 United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991).
92 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).
9 See James R. Agar, II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, ARMY
LAW., Aug. 1999, at 26, 35-37, 42 (1999).
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want to avoid tainting the admissibility debate one way or another by
ruling on the matter before definitive methodologies are constructed.
The Court may also recognize the muddled nature of the debate and
how difficult it would be to craft an admissibility rule that could ef-
fectively cater to widely divergent fact patterns. Finally, the Court
might be satisfied with the ad hoc approach taken thus far by the
lower courts when applying Daubert to the admissibility of false con-
fession expert testimony. Whatever the reason for the Supreme
Court's avoidance of this question, there is no doubt that federal
courts and state courts alike vigorously disagree on the question of
admissibility of false confession expert testimony.94
Each decision in this judicial split has gone one of four ways.
Some courts admit expert testimony that discusses a particular defen-
dant's mental condition at the time the confession was given as a way
to discredit its reliability.9 5 Others admit the testimony, but limit the
discussion to a general description of the phenomenon.96 Still others
permit not only a general discussion of the phenomenon, but also a
particularized discussion of the elements present in the suspect's con-
fession, stopping short of allowing the expert witness to pass judg-
ment on the veracity of the confession.97 Finally, for each example of
admission, there are equally powerful examples of courts at the state
and federal level excluding the testimony-whether or not it dis-
cusses a cognizable mental condition, the false confession phenome-
non in general, or the false confession theory as applied to the specif-
ic contours of the investigation. The discussion below briefly
describes this rather strenuous judicial divide.98
The First Circuit launched one of the first volleys of this de-
bate in United States v. Shay, where the defendant had proffered psy-
chiatric testimony that he was suffering from "pseudologia fantasti-
ca," a condition that causes a person to create an increasingly
94 See id.; Soree, supra note 9, at 227-54.
9 See Shay, 57 F.3d at 131; Raposo, 1998 WL 879723 at *6; Caulley, 2002 WL 392191,
at *4; Stackhouse, 2001 WL 1497217, at *4.
96 See Belyea, 159 F. App'x at 530; Hall, 93 F.3d at 1344-45; Page, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898;
Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 418-19; State v. Miller, No. 15279-1-III, 1997 WL 328740, at *7
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
1 See Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 773-74; Hamilton, 415 N.W.2d at 668-69; Buechler, 572
N.W.2d at 73; Pritchett, 557 S.E.2d at 208.
9 See Adams, 271 F.3d at 1245; Bachman, 953 F.2d at 441; Vent, 67 P.3d at 670; Cobb,
43 P.3d at 869; Davis, 32 S.W.3d at 609; Philips, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19.
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complex web of lies in order to place himself at the center of atten-
tion.99 The First Circuit, although reversing the district court, agreed
that the testimony touches upon the credibility of a particular wit-
ness-in this case the defendant himself.'00 Noting that Rule 702
prohibits an expert from testifying about the veracity of a particular
witness "because the opinion exceeds the scope of the expert's spe-
cialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it
should reach a particular conclusion," the Shay court nevertheless
admitted the expert.' 0' However, the court limited his testimony to a
discussion within his expertise, namely the psychiatric diagnosis, and
not whether he thought the defendant's confession was a lie.102
While acknowledging that the jury has the general capacity to "assess
the reliability" of the defendant's statements without the assistance of
an expert, the court decided that it was plainly erroneous for the dis-
trict court to assume that the jurors could understand the implications
of a specific mental disorder without the assistance of the psychiatr-
ist. 103
Even though the testimony was ruled admissible under Rule
702, the court cautioned that the testimony might still be "disallowed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 if its prejudicial, mislead-
ing, wasteful, confusing, or cumulative nature substantially out-
weighs its probative value." 04 Since experts base their testimony on
science, jurors tend to find the testimony more convincing, and there-
fore the risk of misleading and confusing them increases. 0 5
Shay, although considered a victory of sorts for proponents of
expert testimony for false confessions, is more accurately characte-
rized as a victory for expert testimony on mental disorders. The tes-
timony in question did not involve an expert of false confessions, but
rather a psychiatrist who had studied and analyzed the defendant
' Shay, 57 F.3d at 129-30.
100 Id. at 131.
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Id. at 133-34.
'04 Shay, 57 F.3d at 134.
105 Id.; see also Soree, supra note 9, at 230 ("The court suggested that the trial judge may
need to exercise more caution in applying Rule 403 to experts than to lay testimony, because
the jury may find scientific evidence more convincing and, thus, the potential for the jury to
be misled is increased.").
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carefully and diagnosed him with a cognizable mental illness.'16 The
court's decision was based more on the jury's inability to diagnose
and understand the contours of this particular illness, than on its ina-
bility to determine the credibility of a particular witness's testimony,
or the circumstances that brought about the confession. Other federal
cases have admitted expert testimony on false confessions, but have
qualified their admission with various limitations. 10 7
For example, in United States v. Hall, the Seventh Circuit
found that the district court had erred in excluding the testimony of
Professor Ofshe and Dr. Traugott, a psychiatrist.'0 8 Since Dr. Trau-
gott would have testified about Hall's personality disorder and its ef-
fect on one's statements, and Professor Ofshe would have "let the
jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how
to recognize it, and how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case
being tried," the court ruled that there was a link connecting each
man's testimony to the other, making both relevant to a complete de-
fense.' 09 On remand, the district court reconsidered the State's mo-
tion to exclude Professor Ofshe's testimony and he was given the op-
portunity to testify about the existence of false confessions and the
methodology of his studies,"o but he was "reluctant to state whether
the given confession was in fact true or false.""' Professor Ofshe in-
stead used the opportunity to announce and explain his theory from
the platform of the witness stand, refusing to actually apply it to the
case at hand."12
Ignoring for the moment the fact that the jury is ultimately the
arbiter of credibility, and the final fact finder during a criminal trial,
Professor Ofshe's inability to conclude whether Hall's confession
was true or false raises an important question about the theory's cre-
dibility: if the theory can rarely be applied by its own propo-
nents/experts to specific cases, how is a jury supposed to grapple
with its implications and properly apply it given their relative inexpe-
rience? That one of the leading scholars in this field is unwilling to
1o6 Shay, 57 F.3d at 129.
107 See Hall, 93 F.3d at 1344-45.
'0 Id. at 1339, 1341.
109 Id. at 1344-45.
110 United States v. Hall (Hall l), 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1203-04 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
11 Soree, supra note 9, at 235.
112 Hall II, 974 F. Supp. at 1205.
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go on the record and opine about the veracity of a particular confes-
sion after applying his own analytical framework reveals a deep
structural problem with admitting this type of testimony. Neverthe-
less, the district court placed three restrictions on his testimony: first,
he was not allowed to say that Hall's confession was false; second,
he was not allowed to testify about the discrepancies between the
post-admission narrative and the evidence, since doing so would
trample over the jury's role; and finally, the district court did not al-
low Professor Ofshe to give testimony regarding the defendant's
mental condition since "Ofshe [was] not a clinical psychologist nor a
psychiatrist and ha[d] no expertise in this area."" 3
Steven B. Duke argues that the "strongest case for admissibil-
ity of expert confession testimony would appear to be the psychiatrist
or psychologist who treated the confessor before he was interro-
gated."' 1 4 This argument seems analytically sound: a mental expert
would have the most insight into a particular suspect's mental state
and could, in theory, opine about his susceptibility to confess falsely
and why any particular confession might be false. However, this is
an argument in support of mental health expert testimony, which is
distinct from false confession expert testimony. Indeed, voluntary
confessions usually result "from an underlying psychological distur-
bance or psychiatric disorder.""'5 Presumably, a psychiatrist would
have more insight into a mentally disturbed suspect than a professor
of criminal law. Yet false confession experts, when opining about
voluntary false confessions, are also opining about a medical condi-
tion about which they may have no expertise. As a result, many fed-
eral cases admitting expert testimony on false confessions apply only
to clinical psychiatrists rather than scholars of the phenomenon of
false confessions.1 6 For example, the Southern District of New York
admitted expert testimony from a clinical psychologist who opined
that the defendant's mental conditions made him suggestible and
prone to shift his answers in response to negative feedback." 7
However, other federal cases have been far less forgiving
" Id.
114 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV.
551, 573 (2007).
11 Leo, supra note 14, at 16.
116 See United States v. Mamah, No. 00 CR 396, 2002 WL 34358182, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
4, 2002), aff'd, 332 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003); Raposo, 1998 WL 879723, at *5.
" Raposo, 1998 WL 879723, at *3.
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when determining the admissibility of expert testimony that touches
upon the credibility of the defendant's confession, even when such
testimony is proffered by a mental health specialist. In United States
v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit heard an appeal from the district court's
exclusion of a psychologist's testimony that challenged the credibili-
ty of the defendant's statements to police."'8 The psychologist was
prepared to testify about the defendant's "low neurocognitive func-
tion[s]," its effects on his personality, and how it increased his pro-
pensity to lie to police." 9 Relying on Rule 702, the court decided
that such expert testimony, which necessarily touches upon witness
credibility, invades the province of the jury and exceeds the scope of
the witness's expertise. 2 0 The psychologist was presented as nothing
more than a professionally trained human lie detector. 12 The court
also applied Rule 403 and found that such testimony is overly pre-
judicial for the same reasons the First Circuit cautioned about in
Shay, namely that jurors tend to give such expert testimony a dispro-
portionate amount of credence.122
The Seventh Circuit again addressed the question of admissi-
bility in United States v. Mamah,123 but this time chose to exclude the
testimony, which not only demonstrates an inter-Circuit split across
the nation, but also an intra-Circuit split on this question. In Mamah,
the defendant claimed that he falsely confessed as a result of his ex-
perience living under a military junta in Ghana and the police's inter-
rogation techniques.124 To this end, the defense proffered testimony
from an anthropologist who was an expert on Ghanaian culture, and
Professor Ofshe.125 The court took issue with the testimony's relia-
bility, pointing out that neither expert was a psychiatrist.126 The Se-
venth Circuit also had problems with the relevancy of each expert's
testimony, noting "the absence of an empirical link between [the ex-
perts'] research and the opinion that Mamah likely gave a false con-
"' Adams, 271 F.3d at 1240.
"9 Id. at 1246.
120 Id. at 1245.
121 Id. at 1246 (noting that the expert was "little more than a professionally-trained wit-
ness testifying that, based upon his history, . . . 'Adams .. . would have lied.' ").
122 Id. at 1245.
123 Mamah, 332 F.3d at 476.
124 id
125 id
126 id
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fession."l 27 Although Ofshe was qualified to discuss the existence of
false confessions, since he "could not connect his research to [the de-
fendant's] case" in any meaningful way, the court excluded his testi-
mony.128
The state courts are also divided on this question. State-level
decisions that ultimately admit false confession expert testimony
have followed a similar pattern of qualified admission with a bias
toward experts with degrees in psychology or psychiatry. 129 Again,
these decisions should not be interpreted as wholesale endorsements
of expert testimony on false confessions, but rather admissions of ex-
pert testimony on psychological disorders, and psychiatric opinions.
While false confession researchers typically focus on those defen-
dants who suffer from mental ailments, psychological and psychiatric
testimony is analytically distinct from any testimony that false con-
fession theorists might offer. Nevertheless, in some instances false
confession scholars are allowed to testify in state court, 30 although
their testimony is usually limited to a discussion of false confessions
in general.13 ' Many other state courts exclude false confession expert
testimony at trial, either because it does not meet the Frye stan-
dard,132 it is unhelpful to or usurps the power of the jury,133 or be-
127 Id. at 478.
128 Mamah, 332 F.3d at 478.
129 See State v. Burns, 691 P.2d 297, 302 (Ariz. 1984) (finding that the trial court erred in
excluding expert testimony regarding the effect of hallucinogenic drugs on the defendant's
confession); People v. Lopez, 946 P.2d 478, 484 (Colo. App. 1997) (admitting expert testi-
mony by a psychologist who could opine on the psychological environment surrounding the
interrogation); People v. Rivera, 777 N.E.2d 360, 361, 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (excluding
the testimony of Professor Ofshe, but admitting the testimony of a clinical psychologist);
Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 175, 178 (admitting the testimony of two clinical psychiatrists about the
defendant's mental state during the confession); Hamilton, 415 N.W.2d at 656 (admitting the
testimony of a clinical psychologist, but limiting the testimony so that the expert does not
become a "human lie detector"); Beuchler, 572 N.W.2d at 73 (allowing a clinical psycholo-
gist's testimony regarding four psychological disorders afflicting the defendant); Stack-
house, 2001 WL 1497217, at *2 (permitting the testimony of a psychologist whose analysis
revealed a psychological profile which indicated that the defendant was susceptible to giving
a false confession).
130 Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 420 (admitting Professor Ofshe's testimony).
131 See Page, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912 (permitting a psychologist to testify about the general
factors that might lead to a false confession); State v. Miller, No. 15279-1-Ill, 1997 WL
328740, at *5-7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (granting public funds so that Professor Ofshe could
testify about false confessions generally).
132 State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83, 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (excluding Profes-
sor Kassin's testimony because it did not pass the Frye test).
133 Vent v. State, 67 P.3d 661, 669-70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (excluding the testimony of
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cause the testimony is unreliable or irrelevant.13 4
Clearly there is no consensus on either the federal or state
level regarding the admissibility of false confession expert testimony.
The debate rages on, in part, because both sides have plenty of case
law on the federal and state levels to support either admissibility or
exclusion. Despite the judicial split on the question, the literature
written on this topic has a clear favorite-admissibility. The next
section challenges the prevailing notion that false confession expert
testimony should be admitted during a criminal trial.
III. FALSE CONFESSION EXPERT TESTIMONY FAILS THE
DAUBERT TEST
The Daubert decision, standing alone, addressed scientific
expert testimony, not just expert testimony generally.' 3 5  However,
since false confession expert testimony is not simply generic expert
testimony, but rather based-at least ostensibly-on empirical re-
search, testing, and data collection, courts have consistently held that
Daubert applies to its admission or exclusion.136  Put differently,
Daubert articulates a legal regime that governs the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony;' since false confession expert testimony
is a type of scientific expert testimony,138 it is also governed by the
Daubert regime and its antecedents.139  Moreover, as mentioned
Professor Leo because his conclusions were unquantifiable, and unhelpful to the jury);
People v. Wood 793 N.E.2d 91, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (citing People v. Gilliam, 670
N.E.2d 606, 619 (Ill. 1996)) (holding that juries can comprehend the effects of coercion and
intimidation without the assistance of an expert witness); Cobb, 43 P.3d at 869 (reversing the
trial court's admission of Professor Leo's testimony, reasoning that argument and cross ex-
amination can make the same point); State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 812 (Minn. 1999) (ex-
cluding the testimony on the grounds that juries are capable of assessing whether a police
interrogation can elicit false confessions); Bixler v. State, 582 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn.
1998) (reinstating a trial court's exclusion of psychological testimony that was "nothing
more than a composite of personal characteristics that might render an individual more sus-
ceptible" to giving a false confession).
134 People v. Son, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 883 (Ct. App. 2000) (excluding Professor Ofshe's
testimony because there was no evidence that the interrogation was coercive).
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
See, e.g., Hall, 93 F.3d at 1342 (reversing the district court's exclusion of false confes-
sion expert testimony because the district judge "never mentioned Daubert specifically.").
.37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90.
131 See Hall, 93 F.3d at 1341-42 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94) (asking whether
there is scientific validity to false confession theorists' methodology).
139 See, e.g., Shay, 57 F.3d at 132 (applying Daubert and Rule 702 to the admissibility of
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above, even when false confession expert testimony is proffered as
nonscientific testimony, the same regime applies because Kumho
Tire extended the Daubert decision to apply to all expert testimony,
whether it is "scientific knowledge," "technical knowledge," or "spe-
cialized knowledge."l 40 Therefore, false confession expert testimony
falls squarely under the Daubert regime governing the admissibility
of scientific expert testimony.
Reliability remains the sine qua non of expert testimony. Al-
though there are some courts that have chosen not to strictly apply
Daubert to "technical" and "other specialized knowledge" testimo-
ny,14' even these decisions have emphasized that if at least one thing
"remains constant for all forms of expert testimony [it] is that there
must be some degree of reliability of the expert and [his] me-
thods."l 42 In Daubert the Supreme Court held that scientific testimo-
ny must be accompanied by evidentiary reliability.143 This eviden-
tiary reliability parallels scientific reliability.'" A court may
properly exclude expert testimony on false confessions based on its
finding that the testimony is unreliable.145 A similar exclusion was
affirmed in Kumho Tire, where the Supreme Court reasoned that al-
though the witness was an expert on tires, his methodology was unre-
liable. 1 46
Reliability is a critical litmus test since an expert witness is an
individual who is not otherwise related to the case, but is nevertheless
allowed wide latitude to present opinions wrapped in scientific pres-
tige. Admitting such testimony must be premised on a finding that
the expert's opinion meets a strict and rigorous standard of reliabili-
ty.14 7 Simply because a potential witness is considered an expert in
the traditional sense does not mean that particular witness should be
considered an expert for purposes of expert testimony.14 8 The stan-
false confession expert testimony).
140 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1997) (examining
handwriting analysis without applying Daubert); Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1200.
142 Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1202.
143 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
'" FED. R. EVID. 702.
145 See Shay, 57 F.3d at 133.
'4 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153.
147 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
148 Id. at 597.
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dards to become an "expert" within a particular field may be much
lower than the standards the law demands of an expert witness.14 9
Likewise, even if one is regarded as an expert on the subject of false
confessions the field's notoriously unreliable analysis should disqua-
lify experts like these from testifying in front of a jury. In other
words, false confession theorists may be experts on false confessions
in the traditional sense, but their analysis is too unreliable to be ad-
mitted as expert testimony during a criminal trial.
When determining whether to admit false confession expert
testimony, a court should consider two factors: (i) whether the con-
clusions generated by the experts are supported by sufficient empiri-
cal data and tests; and (ii) whether the data reveals a known or poten-
tial rate of error.' Based on the research and evidence currently
available, it seems clear that the testimony fails to meet either of
these requirements (i.e. there is not enough empirical data on the sub-
ject, and as a result the theory has an unacceptably high rate of error).
False confession scholars want to crown this type of testimony with
"expert" status, but if the proffered expert's testimony is not suffi-
ciently based upon scientific evidence, "at best [he] is offering a gra-
tuitous opinion, and at worst is [exercising] undue influence on the
jury."'5
This section outlines five reasons why expert testimony on
false confessions should not be admitted: (1) the evidence is based
almost entirely upon anecdotal accounts of police-induced false con-
fessions rather than empirical research; (2) the methodology suffers
from an unacceptably high right of error; (3) the phenomenon is not
nearly as widespread as false confession scholars claim; (4) the tes-
timony would invade the province of the jury; and (5) juries can pro-
tect against both false confessions and police coercion. The combi-
nation of these five issues presents serious doubts about the
admissibility of false confession expert testimony.
"9 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the court must determine whether the
expert employs the same standards in the courtroom which "characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field").
150 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
Is' Hall, 93 F.3d at 1343.
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A. Insufficient Empirical Data
Another key component of expert qualification is whether the
theory or technique has been or can be empirically tested.152 To that
end, a critical mass of empirical research must be collected and ana-
lyzed in order to test the hypothesis that certain police interrogation
tactics cause false confessions. At this point, however, no evidence
exists that adequately addresses the question of how often certain in-
terrogation tactics lead to false confessions.15 3 In fact, very little evi-
dence exists that even answers the more general question of how of-
ten the phenomenon of false confessions occurs-regardless of the
police tactic used.154 This rather gaping hole in the empirical re-
search presents not only serious problems for those advocating an
overhaul of police interrogation tactics, but also for those who seek to
proffer false confession expert testimony.
At best, the existing research has shown: 1) that cer-
tain interrogation techniques are more likely than oth-
er techniques to result in false confessions; and 2) that
certain types of people-such as juveniles and the
mentally impaired-appear somewhat more likely
than the average suspect to give a false confession.
The research has not demonstrated, however, how of-
ten the techniques in question result in false confes-
sions, nor what number of suspects in these more vul-
nerable groups give false confessions . . . . [The
research] does not demonstrate that persons in these
groups give false confessions at a substantial rate. 5 5
However, some scholars have conducted empirical research.
For example, Professor Leo and Professor Ofshe conducted a study
in 1998 involving sixty alleged cases of false confessions selected
from a pool of millions of interrogations, which they both acknowl-
152 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
1 LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM 75
(1993) (noting the impossibility of determining the frequency at which innocent suspects
confess falsely).
154 Id. at 85.
155 Magid, supra note 55, at 1192.
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edge does not represent a "statistically adequate sample." 5 6 On top
of its statistical drawbacks, several more analytical weaknesses of the
study are revealed upon closer scrutiny. First, of the sixty cases
cited, only twenty-nine involved suspects who were brought to trial
and convicted, at least in part, due to the confession. 5 7 Assuming the
inculpatory statements made in the remaining thirty-one cases were
all false, the fact that they were not taken to trial and convicted de-
monstrates that the system's screening devices worked more often
than not. A miscarriage of justice has not occurred if an innocent
suspect does not get convicted. In fact, it is quite likely the inculpa-
tory statements made by the innocent suspects did not even rise to the
level of a confession. 5 8
Second, regarding the twenty-nine cases that involved a con-
viction, there is a serious question about whether Professors Leo and
Ofshe are actually correct when they claim that the suspects were in-
nocent, and that therefore their confessions were false. Their asser-
tions that the suspects' confessions were false are hardly indisputa-
ble, since the methodology used to make these determinations, at
times, is tenuous, which raises corollary concerns about their metho-
dology's empirical legitimacy; a portion of their research is based
upon secondary sources and old press accounts of the crime and the
subsequent trial.'" For one case, Leo and Ofshe rely primarily on a
segment of ABC's 20/20,160 to conclude that a defendant was wrong-
fully executed based upon his false confession. 161 Perhaps the most
peculiar instance where Leo and Ofshe claim that a false confession
led to a miscarriage of justice involves the case of Paul Ingram,
156 Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences ofFalse Confessions: Depriva-
tions ofLiberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age ofPsychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 435-36 (1998).
... See id. at 477.
158 This observation raises the question of what makes a confession a confession. Al-
though this is an important issue, this discussion would exceed the scope of this Comment.
Suffice it to say that of the thirty-one cases that did not go to trial, we do not know how
many involved suspects that uttered the phrase, "I did it," or simply some phrase that could
have been considered inculpatory, but only partially so.
1s9 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 156, at 435 n.15.
16o Leo & Ofshe, supra note 156, at 496 n.10. See also 20/20: Confession at Gunpoint?
(ABC television broadcast May 29, 1991) (suggesting that the defendant's confession was
coerced).
161 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 156, at 467-68; see also id. at 455-57 (citing Eye to Eye with
Connie Chung: Confession (CBS television broadcast Jan. 13, 1994)) (providing further
support of an assertion that a convicted murderer's confession was false).
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where the only supporting citation is an article written by Ofshe him-
self.16 2
Another study, conducted by Hugo Bedau and Michael Rade-
let, involving 350 alleged cases of false confessions, also heavily re-
lies on questionable sources in deciding whether the suspect was in-
nocent or not. 163 In many of the cases in their study, a court of law
had not determined the innocence of the suspect, but Bedau and
Radelet nevertheless made that conclusion themselves.164  Often,
their conclusions are belied by the fact that the suspects remain in jail
because a court, after having reviewed the evidence, could not make
a finding of innocence.165 At times Bedau and Radelet's conclusions
are so subjective they even concede that some are "borderline" and
perhaps even "incorrect." 66
One critic argues that the "primary method for determining
guilt or innocence in these cases (not to mention the accuracy of the
confessions) seems both unscientific and highly subjective." 67
Simply put, false confession theorists make empirical claims without
having conducted sufficient empirical research. The best sample in-
volves a few dozen cherry-picked interrogations from a sample size
of over twenty-three million confessions, or roughly 0.00000152% of
the total.16 8 This sample size is hardly significant, much less reliable.
These shortcuts in research methods fundamentally undercut the cor-
responding claims regarding the frequency of false confessions and
the applicability of their research to particular cases when proffering
false confession expert testimony. Right now, the numbers above
roughly indicate that one out of every million police interrogations
162 Karen A. Olio & William F. Cornell, The Ingram Case: Pseudomemory or Pseudos-
cience?, VIOLENCE UPDATE, June 1994, at 5 (1994) (criticizing Ofshe's article as "specula-
tive").
163 Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capi-
tal Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 23-24 (1987).
164 See id. at 47-48 (explaining that the study's determination of a suspect's innocence
may not be universally accepted).
16, Id. at 47.
166 Id.
16 Agar, supra note 93, at 29.
168 See Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief
Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1123, 1127 (1997) (calculating
that twenty-three million suspects were interrogated between 1987 and 1997 for index
crimes).
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produces a false confession.169 The argument that the witness's con-
clusion-presumably that the confession was false, or could have
been false-is a critical and relevant finding, even if true, misses the
point. The focus here is "not on the conclusion[]," which in theory
can be vitally important, but rather on the methodology and prin-
ciples behind the conclusion.'70 In this case, the conclusion and the
principles behind the conclusion are both logical and coherent: some
people confess to crimes they did not commit during the course of a
police interrogation. That being said, the methodology is too unreli-
able to admit as expert testimony.
For example, Saul Kassin and Katherine Keichel conducted
an experiment using undergraduates who were led to believe they
were participating in a typing study.' 7' Before beginning, each stu-
dent was told that pressing the ALT key "would cause the program to
crash." 72  Of course the computers in the experiment were pro-
grammed to shut down in instances where the ALT key was not
pressed. 7 3 Of those participants whose computer shut down nearly
seventy-percent signed a confession stating they had hit ALT, nearly
thirty-percent "internalized" the admission, and nearly ten-percent
provided collaborating details.174 Kassin and Keicher's conclusion
was that the experiment supported the "provocative notion that the
presentation of false incriminating evidence-an interrogation ploy
that is common among the police and sanctioned by many courts-
can induce people to internalize blame for outcomes they did not
produce."' 7 5
The problem with false confession experts' reliance upon
these experiments to illustrate the dynamics of false confession pro-
duction is that they are unrealistic when compared to an act involving
criminal intent. The built-in limitations of this experiment are ob-
169 See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confes-
sions and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 516-17 (1998) (discussing that
a rate of wrongful convictions of 0.5% is inflated and an actual estimate of less than 1% can
include 0.0001%).
170 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
17 Kassin & Keichel, supra note 16, at 126.
172 id.
174 Id. at 127; see also Soree, supra note 3, at 198 (describing the Kassin & Kleicher expe-
riment).
175 Kassin & Keichel, supra note 16, at 127.
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vious: none of the subjects were accused of an actual crime, and no
suspect faced anything close to the high stakes a criminal suspect
faces. Kassin concedes that the subjects themselves are not the typi-
cal false confession victims, given that they were relatively intelli-
gent college students under very little pressure to defend themselves
against a relatively trivial allegation.176 The entire experiment might
as well have been for naught since the most important empirical
question remained unanswered: to what extent did the students' be-
havior generalize to criminal suspects under interrogation?
In fact, Professor Leo also rejects any parallel between these
experimental laboratory tests and the notion that suspects sometimes
falsely confess.' 7 7 For both ethical and practical constraints, there is
no data that conclusively demonstrates that officers can manufacture
false memories during even the most rigorous of interrogations, and
no evidence actually indicates that an interrogation can cause sus-
pects to create memories.' 78 If a suspect begins citing memories of
the crime that are consistent with the investigation, and without being
force-fed any details from interrogators, it is more likely than not that
these memories are legitimate rather than false creations of memory.
The "experimental studies specifically demonstrating the distortion
and creation of false memories in the laboratory are not directly rele-
vant to and thus misconceive the psychology of persuaded false con-
fessions." 79 There is no substitute for a real interrogation where the
interrogating party is pulling all the stops, and the suspect has far
more riding on its outcome than simply taking the fall for a mistaken
keystroke. Without valid parallels with real interrogations, the em-
pirical research will always be fatally limited to unrealistic experi-
ments that prove very little. This is perhaps the biggest reason why
false confession researchers rely so heavily upon anecdotal evidence
and secondary sources.
176 Id.
17 Leo, supra note 19, at 223.
178 See Agar, supra note 93, at 28-29.
The emotional and psychological damage inflicted on test subjects to
falsely confess to a murder or rape they did not commit exceeds the to-
lerance of most people. . . . Therefore, adopting Kassin's experiment to
more closely approximate the conditions faced by the typical criminal
suspect may not be possible.
Id.
179 Leo, supra note 19, at 224.
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False confession theorists have heard the oft-repeated critique
that their research is missing an empirical anchor, and have respond-
ed in several ways. 8 0 First, they argue that since no government or
private organization keeps track of how frequently false confessions
occur, a meaningful incidence rate cannot be determined, and there-
fore should not be expected.'"' Second, researchers trying to identify
a possible false confession are usually denied "primary case mate-
rials" such as police reports, transcripts, and electronic recordings of
interrogations. 8 2 Finally, even when primary materials are available,
it is almost always impossible to determine with certainty that the
confession was false. 83  Given these hurdles, false confession re-
searchers argue that they should not be expected to produce the same
level of empirical data as other scientific scholars.' 84 Indeed, false
confession theorists bring up a reasonable concern: why should their
policy recommendations be ignored simply because the harm they
discuss is difficult to measure?18 5
However, this counterargument ultimately misses the point.
Daubert and Rule 702 both place limits on the admissibility of expert
testimony purportedly based upon scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge.' 8 6 False confession expert testimony falls under
the definition of "scientific" expert testimony;187 as such, this testi-
mony must be grounded "in the methods and procedures of
science. When scientific expert testimony is proffered, the
judge's task is to ensure that the testimony is reliable, a requirement
that can be revealed through the expert's methodology.'8 9 This coun-
terargument amounts to a concession that false confession theorists
ISO See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey
ofPolice Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 395 (2007).
181 Leo, supra note 14, at 4.
182 Id. at 4-5.
18 Id. at 5 ("In the vast majority of alleged false confession cases, it is therefore impossi-
ble to completely remove any possible doubts about the confessor's innocence.").
184 See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1228-29 (2001).
18s See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Re-
sponse to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1135, 1139 (1997).
186 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90; FED. R. EvID. 702.
Hall, 93 F.3d at 1342.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
89 Id at 589.
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cannot meet the same empirical standards applied to other scientific
expert testimony - which reveals two things. The first is that pre-
sently there is no methodology that could ensure the reliability of
false confession expert testimony. And second, this counterargument
also reveals that we cannot with certainty draw any causal links be-
tween particular police interrogation tactics and false confessions.
Without any long-term empirical data, we cannot determine any pat-
terns; and without a pattern we are left only with a phenomenon that
happens to occur about once every million confessions.
Given this dredge in empirical research, one might argue that
currently no false confession "expert" can legally provide expert tes-
timony pursuant to the mandates of Daubert, since it is impossible to
gauge the reliability of their evidence. As Welsh White notes,
Although the empirical data can identify factors that
are conducive to eliciting false confessions, they can-
not tell us how often standard interrogation methods
produce false confessions . . . . Thus, estimates as to
the number or percentage of cases . . . seem likely to
be based on little more than speculation. 190
Again, false confession theorists admit that their theory is nearly im-
possible to test, and equally impossible to measure.191 This short-
coming becomes a crucial factor for a court when deciding the merits
of a witness's qualifications to give expert testimony: if an expert's
theory is virtually untestable, he functionally concedes that a jury is
just as qualified as he to evaluate the evidence without him. The em-
pirical data is simply too meager to allow this kind of testimony to
enter as expert scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
B. A High Potential Rate of Error
The relative superficiality of the empirical data directly leads
to another problem with false confession expert testimony: the lack
of a known or potential rate of error when detecting a false confes-
sion. One important question is how often are these experts wrong
190 White, supra note 38, at 131-32.
191 Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Anoth-
er Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CuMi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 560-61 (1998).
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when they label a particular confession as false? Known as the "rate
of error" or the "potential rate of error," this ratio quantifies the accu-
racy of an expert's analysis when applied to particular cases. This is
an especially important statistic for expert testimony since experts are
rarely involved intimately with a case, but rather brought in to opine
about a specific aspect during trial. If the proffered testimony is
based on a theory or test that has a relatively high rate of error, the
testimony should either be excluded under Daubert, or presented
without its "expert" status. Those theories that cannot demonstrate a
rate of error present problems for courts: if the trial court cannot de-
termine whether the theory is scientifically valid, there is no reason to
grant the testimony evidentiary reliability or relevance-two key fac-
tors under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.192
For example, the 1998 study of sixty cases of false confes-
sions can be broken down as follows: thirty-four were "proven" false
confessions; eighteen were "highly probable false confessions[;]" and
eight were "probable false confessions."19 3 However, of the twenty-
nine cases in the Leo/Ofshe study that resulted in conviction, only
nine involved instances of undisputed false confessions.194 In fact,
one scholar found that of the remaining twenty cases, nine were in
fact guilty, meaning false confession theorists were wrong forty-five
percent of the time.195 As one critic puts it, a "coin toss would almost
prove as accurate." 196 Such a high rate of error suggests two prob-
lems with the theory. First, it is highly subjective, leading "well-
educated, and legally savvy persons [to] find such dissimilar re-
sults." 97 Accordingly, this level of subjectivity should be left to the
jury-not to expert testimony. The second problem is that the foun-
dation of the theory itself is questionable since not even its most
faithful advocates can accurately identify false confessions.198
False confession theorists propose that false confessions oc-
cur regularly, a claim that will be challenged in the next section.
'9' See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 156, at 436-38.
194 Id. at 478.
'95 Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination ofAlleged Cases of
Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 587-88
(1999).
196 Agar, supra note 93, at 32.
19 Id.
198 Id.
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However, if false confessions were as endemic as these scholars
claim, then the barriers to measuring the frequency of false confes-
sions by conducting an empirical study based upon random samples
would be negligible, because researchers would have a significant
quantity of false confessions to survey. Indeed, a good reason to sub-
ject this kind of testimony to the rigors of Daubert, even if it means
excluding it, is to encourage scholars to conduct the research neces-
sary to determine a potential rate of error, especially if the phenome-
non is as rampant as they claim. As it stands, the only rate of error
available indicates that the theory is not yet ready to be admitted as
expert testimony.
C. The Rarity of False Confessions Precludes
Empirical Testing and a Known Rate of Error
False confession theorists have a very logical sequence of ar-
guments: certain defendants are prone to give false confessions as a
result of certain police interrogation tactics; because of this, false
confession theorists should be allowed to testify as expert witnesses
to inform the jury of this phenomenon and explain why it might ap-
ply in a particular case; and, finally, police interrogation tactics
should be overhauled in order to prevent the production of false con-
fessions.1 99 While this sequence flows freely and coherently, ulti-
mately the most important strand in the argument is that false confes-
sions actually occur, and that they are prevalent. The burden of proof
is not on those who would defend the status quo, but rather on those
who would change it based upon a known or unknown problem.200
Put differently, if false confession theorists cannot prove that normal
innocent suspects can give false confessions, and that their metho-
dology can accurately detect these occurrences, then any critique
based upon their findings can be nothing more than a Potemkin vil-
lage. That false confessions occur is a matter of fact; however, it is
also true that false confessions are rare. As mentioned above, the
best sample involves a few dozen instances of false confessions from
a total sample size of over twenty-three million confessions, or
9 See infra Part III.
200 See, e.g., Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Three-Dimensional Model for the Use of Ex-
pert Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier
ofFact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 783, 813 (2003).
2010] 53
31
Perez: False Confession Expert Testimony
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOUROLAWREVIEW
roughly one out of every million.201
The main reason why false confession theorists cannot pro-
vide either a potential rate of error or solid empirical evidence is be-
cause false confessions are extraordinarily rare, and almost always
involve a mentally challenged suspect. 202 The statistical insignific-
ance may be the reason false confessions cannot be quantified, ex-
amined, or empirically tested.203 Despite the repeated warnings that
incidences of false confessions are widespread and endemic, so far
the evidence establishes that the incidences of false confessions are
few and far between. As a result, the existing research suffers from a
myopic focus on the causes rather than the prevalence of false con-
fessions.
The implications of incident-rarity cannot be overstated; for it
is at this point that the theory begins to go awry. Incidence-rarity be-
comes an almost insurmountable barrier to conducting more empiri-
cal research. Without more instances of proven and indisputable
false confessions to study, a cogent detection method with a respect-
able rate of error cannot be established. Without a workable theory,
complete with a known rate of error and backed by empirical re-
search, false confession theorists cannot seriously advocate funda-
mental changes to the criminal justice system.
Given the abject rarity of false confessions, allowing a self-
proclaimed false confession expert to testify in a trial where the pros-
ecution relies upon a confession would, more often than not, be un-
reasonable. The expert's testimony may plant the seeds of doubt in a
jury's mind regarding the veracity of an otherwise truthful confes-
sion, and may lead to the exoneration of a guilty person. Aggressive
ex ante preventive measures, combined with a spirited cross-
examination, persuasive opening and closing arguments, and possibly
even cautionary instructions during those rare occurrences where a
possible false confession may lead to wrongful conviction, can help
keep guilty persons behind bars, while keeping innocent suspects out
of jail.204
201 Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief
Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1123, 1127 n.35 (1997).
202 See, e.g., Shay, 57 F.3d at 129-30 (defendant suffered from "pseudologia fantastica," a
condition that causes a person seek attention by creating an increasingly complex web of
lies).
203 Leo, supra note 14, at 4.
204 See infra Part II.B.5.
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D. False Confession Expert Testimony Invades the
Province of the Jury
False confession expert testimony should not be admitted be-
cause it invariably robs the jury of its exclusive role as the arbiter of
witness credibility. 20 5 As mentioned, the presentation of false con-
fession expert testimony can take multiple forms. At times the expert
is a mental health specialist, either a psychologist or a psychiatrist,
who has examined the suspect and opines about the effects that a cer-
tain mental affliction might have on the veracity of the confession.206
These cases should be distinguished from other forms of false con-
fession expert testimony, since these opinions present medical testi-
mony, rather than social scientific testimony. The most hotly con-
tested forms of false confession expert testimony involve experts
outside of the medical field, such as law professors.2 07 Since these
witnesses are typically unqualified to testify about a particular defen-
dant's mental health, they often discuss, or offer to discuss: (1) the
phenomenon of false confessions generally; (2) certain aspects of a
confession, especially the interrogation and the post-admission narra-
tive, explicitly linking the facts of the case with the false confession
phenomenon; and (3) the expert's conclusion, implicit or explicit, re-
garding the veracity of the defendant's confession.208
Admitting expert testimony on false confessions presents a
205 See, e.g., Bachman, 953 F.2d at 441 ("It is the exclusive province of the jury to deter-
mine the believability of the witness . ... An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as
to the believability or truthfulness of a [witness's] story."); Benson, 941 F.2d at 604 ("Credi-
bility is not a proper subject for expert testimony; the jury does not need an expert to tell it
whom to believe .... ); State v. Boston, 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1240 (Ohio 1989) (rejecting ex-
pert testimony regarding the veracity of a witness).
206 See, e.g., Lopez, 946 P.2d at 484 (admitting expert testimony by a psychologist who
could opine on the psychological environment surrounding the interrogation); Beuchler, 572
N.W.2d at 73 (allowing a clinical psychologist's testimony regarding four psychological
disorders afflicting the defendant).
207 See, e.g., Agar, supra note 93, at 26.
208 See Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact ofDaubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral
Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REv 403, 441 (2003) ("[T]estimony regarding empirical re-
search into the phenomenon of false confessions is permitted if the expert offers only gene-
ralized information."); see also Soree, supra note 9, at 235 ("Dr. Ofshe was reluctant to state
whether the given confession was in fact true or false, but indicated his preference to illumi-
nate the jury as to the possibility of its falsity given the risk factors present in the interroga-
tion."); Juliet Gee, Anatomy of a False Confession, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2009, at 52 ("[A]n
expert testified that the veracity of the confession was unreliable because of the interrogation
techniques and Clarence's desire to say anything to end the interrogation.").
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Catch-22 for courts and juries. While some false confession scholars
are certainly qualified to testify in a given trial that false confessions
occur, without discussing or presenting evidence that the defendant
experienced coercive police interrogation, or was susceptible to giv-
ing a false confession, the witness would not be able to make his tes-
timony relevant to the particulars of the case.209 If there is no link be-
tween the testimony and the case, the testimony must be excluded
pursuant to Rule 702.210 However, as the testimony becomes more
relevant, it also begins to invade the jury's role to make determina-
tions of credibility about the defendant's statements. 211 For example,
comparing the post admission narrative with the facts of the case is a
determination of credibility, and is therefore a clear invasion of the
jury's province.
False confession theorists respond to this critique by pointing
out that jurors typically do not believe that false confessions occur.212
If most jurors do not believe that sometimes an innocent person con-
fesses to a crime that they did not commit, expert testimony on the
subject does not invade the province of the jury, but actually helps
the average juror understand that this phenomenon does in fact occur.
In this way, false confession expert testimony helps combat against
the "myth of psychological interrogation," that is, the myth that false
confessions do not occur.213 However, the numbers simply do not
support the notion that this myth exists. For instance, one statistic
used to demonstrate this myth is that sixty eight percent of potential
jurors in the District of Columbia believe that suspects falsely con-
fess "not very often" or "almost never."2 14 Implying that these an-
swers foreclose even the possibility of false confessions within the
minds of jurors is simply wordplay: "not very often" and "almost
never" do not mean "never." In fact, the data clearly corroborates
most jurors' beliefs that concede the possibility of a false confession
209 See, e.g., Mamah, 332 F.3d at 478 (rejecting false confession testimony because it was
not shown to be relevant to the case).
210 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-90.
211 See, e.g., Cobb, 43 P.3d at 868-69 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that as the testimony
became more "particularized to the circumstances of the case" it began to invade "the jury's
province to make a credibility determination about the defendant's statement").212 See, e.g., L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons of the Central Park
Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 209, 250 (2006).
213 Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confession in America, CHAMPiON, Dec. 31,
2007, at 31.
214 Leo, supra note 19, at 196.
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in a given case, while also noting its statistical improbability.215  The
notion that some suspects might confess to something they did not do
is within the common knowledge of jurors.2 1 6
The jury has a monopoly on determining witness credibili-
ty.2 17 Putting aside concerns that this testimony would supplant the
jury's role to measure witness credibility, the testimony would also
convert the expert witness into a human lie detector.218 No trial
judge, expert witness, or polygraph technician may take the job of lie
detecting away from the jury.219 Juries must sit through an entire trial
215 If judges were instructed to suppress as unreliable those confessions whose post-
admission narratives did not align with the facts of the case, many truthful confessions
would also be lost, since many suspects fail to give full or completely accurate confessions
to interrogators. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 20, at 1118:
Rather, consistent with the judge's role as a gatekeeper responsible for
excluding untrustworthy evidence that has a strong tendency to mislead
the jury, the judge should not admit confessions without finding that the
confession meets minimal standards of reliability . . . . Interrogations
that fail to produce a good fit between the post-admission narrative and
the crime facts are highly suspect because they may have been induced
from an innocent party.
Id. See also Cassell, supra note 195, at 524 ("They accordingly recommend that
judges should be empowered to review confessions for 'reliability' through close
scrutiny of the 'post-admission narrative' of suspects").
216 State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 577 (Mo. 1988) (determining that the proffered
false confession expert testimony was within the jury's common knowledge).
217 George Fisher cites the following examples:
Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions § 1.09 (1990) ("You are the sole
judges of the credibility or 'believability' of each witness and the weight
to be given the witness's testimony."); California Jury Instructions,
Criminal § 2.20 (West 1993) ("You are the sole judges of the believa-
bility of a witness . . . ."); 17 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Criminal
Jury Instructions § 3.04 (Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. & P. Raymond Lamonica
eds., 1994) ("[You are] the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses ...
."); Wisconsin Jury Instructions, Criminal § 300 (1962 & Supp. 1976)
("You are the sole judges of the credibility of the several witnesses ...
."); United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he
jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.").
George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 713 n.1 (1997). See also
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining the standards used to evaluate expert witness cre-
dibility).
218 Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244-45.
219 Fisher, supra note 217, at 577-78.
All hierarchies of rank, learning, and technical prowess give way in the
face of this asserted power of common jurors to spot a lie: In most juris-
dictions today, no trial judge may advise the jury that a witness has lied.
No psychiatric expert may comment on a witness's credibility. Rarely
may a polygraph technician lecture to jurors about a witness's pulse and
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and grapple with the gamut of evidence presented before they are
asked to determine the suspect's credibility. False confession expert
witnesses are rarely involved with the case, and are merely asked to
analyze the confession from the prism of the post-admission narrative
and the context surrounding the interrogation. Courts should be as
wary of admitting human lie detectors as they are of admitting the re-
sults of a polygraph test.
One critical observation is that different forms of false con-
fession expert testimony affect the jury in different ways. Indeed, as
stated, false confession expert testimony can take at least three forms:
first, a potential expert witness might simply testify that the pheno-
menon of false confessions exists, and perhaps provide some exam-
ples or explanations; second, an expert witness might testify about
the interrogative techniques that produce false confessions, and
whether they exist in the present case; or third, the expert might go
even further and opine about the reliability of the particular confes-
* 220
sion the jury is considering.
The first option simply states a well-established fact: that
people sometimes, albeit very rarely, confess falsely. The admissibil-
ity question here would be whether this observation, standing alone,
"assist[s] the trier of fact." 221 Whether it would or not depends on
whether a jury can be expected to understand that false confessions
occur. 222 If so, there is no need for expert testimony that tells the jury
what it already knows. If not, there is a need, but perhaps that need
can be met during opening and closing argument, cross-examination,
and jury instructions. To determine whether an expert's testimony
will assist the trier of fact, a court must decide whether an untrained
layperson would be qualified to determine intelligently a resolution
to the particular issue without the help from those having more spe-
pressure, tension or temperature. The job of lie detecting belongs to the
jurors alone. Nor may we later, once the jurors have done their job of
sifting truth from falsehood, review how they did it.
Id
220 Harry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral
Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 416-17 (2003).
221 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
222 Benson, 941 F.2d at 604 ("An expert's opinion is helpful only to the extent the expert
draws on some special skill, knowledge, or experience to formulate [his] opinion; the opi-
nion must be an expert opinion (that is, an opinion informed by the witness' expertise) rather
than simply an opinion broached by a purported expert.").
[Vol. 2658
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223
cialized knowledge of the matter.22 As it stands, most jurors have a
nuanced understanding that false confessions occur, but only rare-
ly. 224 An expert witness that simply repeats this fact is not "assisting
the trier of fact."
The second option, explaining what interrogative techniques
tend to produce false confessions and whether they exist in the
present case, runs into three problems. First, as noted throughout
Part III, false confession theorists have very little empirical evidence
for these conclusions, and their methodologies have failed to produce
a known rate of error; therefore, they would not qualify as experts.225
Second, as we will see in Part IV, there is also very little evidence
that certain police interrogation tactics actually produce false confes-
sions.226 On the one hand, false confession theorists cannot detect a
false confession any better than a layperson; on the other hand, any
potential discussion of police interrogation tactics is fraught with
ambiguity. Third, any testimony that explains the contours of false
confessions, the police interrogation techniques that produce them,
and then points out that those conditions exist in the present case,
comes perilously close to drawing conclusions for the jury.227
If the second option approaches the jury's province, the third
option launches a full-scale invasion by opining about the veracity
and credibility of a particular confession. The expert witness cannot
opine about the credibility of another witness's statement, even if that
witness is the defendant and the statement is a confession. 228 Addi-
223 Shay, 57 F.3d at 132-33.
224 Leo, supra note 213, at 31 (reporting that nearly seventy percent of jurors believe that
false confessions occur, but rarely).
225 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (listing four requirements to qualify as expert testimony:
(1) whether the theory can be empirically tested; (2) whether this testing has revealed the
known or potential error rate of the theory; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication; and (4) whether the theory has been widely accepted within its re-
spective field or community).
226 Magid, supra note 55, at 1190-91.
227 See, e.g., Cobb, 43 P.3d at 868 (noting that as the testimony became more "particula-
rized to the circumstances of the case" it began to invade "the jury's province to make a cre-
dibility determination about the defendant's statement").
228 See Shay, 57 F.3d at 133 (stating that the jury has the general capacity to "assess the
reliability" of the defendant's statements without the assistance of an expert); Hall II, 974 F.
Supp. at 1204-5 (disallowing a false confession expert witness to testify about the discrepan-
cies between the post-admission narrative and the evidence, since he was not only unquali-
fied to assess the defendant's credibility, but doing so would trample over the jury's role);
Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244-45 (deciding that such expert testimony, which necessarily touches
upon witness credibility, invades the province of the jury and exceeds the scope of the wit-
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tionally, the same empirical questions that apply to the second option
apply here: there is simply not enough data to admit this kind of ex-
pert testimony.
The next section discusses the false confession theorists' cri-
tique of police interrogations, and argues that these empirical prob-
lems, combined with the rarity of false confessions, should temper
any attempt to drastically change our criminal justice system.
E. Juries Can Protect Against False Confessions and
Police Coercion
Excluding false confession expert testimony would not leave
defendants defenseless against coercive police interrogation, or
against the risk of a wrongful conviction based upon a false confes-
sion. In particular, those who criticize false confession theorists have
generally focused on the shortcomings of the research, while ignoring
the false confession theorists' argument that juries cannot compre-
hend the phenomenon without expert testimony. 229 This Section ar-
gues that juries provide adequate protection against the use of false
confessions.
It has already been noted that most jurors actually acknowl-
edge the existence of the false confession phenomenon-despite its
infrequency. 230 Given that reality, cross-examination is an adequate
tool to not only expose police coerciveness, but also to question the
credibility of a particular confession. The defendant can choose to
cross-examine the police interrogators to expose their techniques, in-
cluding the length of the interrogation, the conditions the defendant
faced, and the content of the questions asked. Opening and closing
arguments are another venue where the defendant, in the jury's pres-
ence, could develop the theory that the confession is false, and was
induced by coercive tactics. Finally, cautionary instructions given to
the jury by the trial judge can also have the desired effect of ac-
knowledging the existence of false confessions without superfluously
minting such testimony with scientific validity. A well-constructed
ness's expertise); see also id. at 1246 (describing the proffered expert as "little more than a
professionally-trained witness testifying that, based upon his history, [defendant] . . . would
have lied.").
229 Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REv.
871, 872-73 (2008).
230 Leo, supra note 213, at 31.
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cautionary instruction would encourage a jury to consider other evi-
dence, including that which points to innocence, rather than simply
focusing on the confession. All in all, forceful cross-examination,
combined with persuasive opening and closing arguments, and care-
fully worded cautionary instructions, are adequate safeguards to pro-
tect defendants against police coercion and false confessions. 23 1
One powerful rebuttal against allowing a jury to decide for it-
self the veracity of a particular confession-that is, in the absence of
a false confession expert-is that certain confessions arrive in the
jury's lap having already been wrongly molded by deceptive police
coercion.232 Therefore, in certain cases, expert testimony can help the
jury as the trier of fact by describing how certain interrogation tactics
might cause a person to falsely confess. This argument is very po-
werful: how is the jury expected to adjudicate between competing in-
terpretations of a given confession if the most straight-forward inter-
pretation-that the confession is true-has been tainted by police
interference that is often difficult, if not impossible, for a jury to
detect on its own? When seen against this backdrop, the call for ad-
mission of false confession expert testimony is hardly irrational, and
in fact a very logical response to what amounts to an apparent break-
down in the jury system. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why
juries should still be allowed to draw their own conclusions when it
comes to the veracity of a particular confession.
There are other safeguards in place that prevent exceptionally
untrustworthy confessions from reaching a jury. In 1884, the Su-
preme Court challenged the notion that only guilty persons confess
by observing that particularly abusive interrogations, known as the
"third degree," could be used to extract confessions involuntarily.233
Involuntariness became an indictment of reliability, which was later
used as a reason to suppress a confession before it even reached the
23jury.23 Additionally, in Spano v. New York, the Court suppressed a
confession after the police interrogator used his relationship with the
suspect to extract a confession. 235 But recall that in Colorado v.
Connolly, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's confession
231 State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Kan. 1981).
232 Leo, supra note 213, at 31.
233 Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
234 Brown, 297 U.S. at 286-87, 317.
235 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959).
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was admissible, despite his apparent mental illness, because it was
voluntary; that is, it was given in the absence of particularly abusive
police overreaching.236 Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled
that a confession is inadmissible when particularly onerous police
misconduct was used to extract it.237 Therefore, the argument that ju-
ries need false confession expert testimony in order to hedge against
confessions extracted under abusive conditions, while very logical on
face, seems less pressing when one considers the safeguards already
in place that target abusive interrogations.
However, false confession theorists also point out that jurors
are not psychiatrists, and therefore should not be expected to know
about certain mental illnesses. 238  To be sure, there are instances
where juries are patently unqualified to analyze certain evidence by
themselves, namely when a cognizable mental illness or condition is
involved. Indeed, at first blush, one of the best arguments in favor of
false confession expert testimony appears to involve the suspect's
psychiatrist, who can then testify about his or her mental state.239
Even so, there are several reasons why the admission of psychiatric
expert testimony should not be used as a way to displace the jury.
First, even when expert psychiatric testimony is proffered and
admitted, juries still have a role to play in this process. For example,
juries may not be able to diagnose a suspect with post-traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD"), but after having heard from a trained psy-
236 Connolly, 479 U.S. at 163-64.
237 See, e.g., Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 151 (noting that defendant had been kept awake for
thirty-six hours during interrogations); Payne, 356 U.S. at 566-67 (rejecting confession
where defendant had been held incommunicado for three days with little food and where po-
lice threatened defendant with a lynch mob); Culombe, 367 U.S. at 605 (labeling police tac-
tics of interrogating defendant nonstop for five days as "coercive"); Reck, 367 U.S. at 441-
42 (excluding confession where defendant was held for four days with inadequate food and
medical attention); Davis, 384 U.S. at 739-46 (subjecting defendant to sixteen days of in-
communicado isolation within a windowless cell, repeated interrogations, and limited food);
Beecher, 389 U.S. at 38 (excluding a confession obtained after a police officer held a gun to
defendant's head); Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 521 (observing that defendant had been interro-
gated for over eighteen hours without food or sleep); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 397-99 (holding
that confession is excludable where defendant is subjected a long interrogation while incapa-
citated and sedated in an intensive-care unit).
238 Shay, 57 F.3d at 133-34.
239 See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that the jury has the general capacity to "assess the relia-
bility" of the defendant's statements, but deciding that it was plainly erroneous for the dis-
trict court to assume that the jurors could understand the implications of a specific mental
disorder without the assistance of the psychiatrist); Rivera, 777 N.E.2d at 364 (excluding the
testimony of Professor Ofshe, but admitting the testimony of a clinical psychologist).
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chiatrist that a suspect suffers from PTSD, the jury should then be al-
lowed to draw its own conclusions about the effect of this testimony
on the probative weight of the confession. An expert witness's role
is limited to presenting to the jury her specialized knowledge, and
should not extend to drawing conclusions about the veracity of a par-
ticular confession.240
Second, juries are constantly asked to grapple with other, po-
tentially more difficult, issues, such as determining whether a witness
is lying on the stand; whether an eyewitness could have identified the
suspect from a certain distance; whether a character witness's testi-
mony has any probative value; and even whether a defendant de-
serves the death penalty.24' These tasks also involve very difficult
questions of fact, but are nevertheless assigned to jurors in the ab-
sence of expert witnesses who might otherwise make conclusions for
them. 242 Certainly, there are times when a particular witness may lie,
or when the testimonies of two separate witnesses directly contradict
each other. But an expert cannot be called to testify about which
witness is lying and which is telling the truth. Rule 702 explicitly
prohibits an expert from testifying about the veracity of a particular
witness "because [it] exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized
knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach
a particular conclusion." 243 The Tenth Circuit has also noted that
Rule 702 proscribes psychiatrists from drawing conclusions about a
witness's credibility since they are not "human lie detector[s]."244
Third, as noted above in Part II-C, psychiatric testimony is
analytically distinct from false confession expert testimony, since
false confession theorists are not psychiatrists and therefore are not
qualified to opine about the medical conditions about which they
have no expertise.245 Put differently, admitting psychiatric testimony
is not the same as admitting false confession expert testimony: the
240 Shay, 57 F.3d at 131 (limiting a psychiatrist's testimony to a discussion within his ex-
pertise, namely the psychiatric diagnosis, and not whether he thought the defendant's con-
fession was a lie).
241 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that a jury, not a judge, must find
the presence or absence of aggravating factors required by Arizona law for the imposition of
the death penalty).
242 Soree, supra note 9, at 262.
243 Shay, 57 F.3d at 131.
244 United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404, 410 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
245 Hall, 93 F.3d at 1341.
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former informs the jury about a technical topic (i.e., a mental illness),
while the latter draws conclusions for the jury regarding the credibili-
ty of a particular statement. In some cases juries can use the help of a
trained psychiatrist to understand the effects a particular mental ill-
ness might have had on the defendant, but when it comes to deciding
how much weight to assign the confession, that role is reserved-
according to Rule 702-for the jury.24 6 While a defendant's mental
condition may be relevant, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that a particular mental condition could be dispositive when deter-
mining a confession's credibility. 247
IV. THE FALSE CONFESSION THEORISTS' CRITIQUE OF POLICE
INTERROGATION: SOUNDING A FALSE ALARM
False confession theorists use the aforementioned typologies,
as well as the existing evidence on false confessions, to buttress their
claim that police interrogation tactics must be fundamentally changed
because their inherently coercive and deceptive nature is far too con-
248ducive to the production of false confessions. Indeed, virtually all
interrogations involve some form of deception, such as the "good
cop, bad cop" routine, exaggerating incriminating evidence, acting
kindly and expressing sympathy to create a rapport, convincing the
suspect that it is in his best interest to confess, or some combination
thereof.249 Each of these interrogation tactics are indicted under the
false confession charge and would need to be changed if the prevail-
ing notion-namely, that false confessions pose a serious and endem-
ic problem for our criminal justice system-were accepted by judges
and lawmakers. 25 0 This criticism, while overstating the problem of
246 Fisher, supra note 217, at 577 n.3.
247 Connolly, 479 U.S. at 164.
248 See, e.g., Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 42, 61 (1968) (correcting "the imbalance created by the 'inherently coercive'
atmosphere might be no less than tantamount to the abolition of the institution"); Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94
MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2669-71 (1996) (advocating that standard interrogation be replaced al-
together with questioning by a neutral party); White, supra note 38, at 111 (arguing that
those interrogation methods linked to false confessions "should be prohibited").
249 Magid, supra note 55, at 1168-69; see also Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Tech-
niques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 793-795 (2006).
250 Magid, supra note 55, at 1175-77.
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false confessions and failing to link police interrogation tactics to the
production of false confessions, would nevertheless impose a drastic
change to the way suspects are interrogated. Even so, the calls to
overhaul our criminal justice system ring louder now more than ever.
An unusual asymmetry exists in the literature on this topic, whereby
the main critics of false confession theorists have not answered the
false confession critique of police interrogation. 251 As a result, the
critique of police interrogation tactics has gone virtually unanswered.
This section begins to address this imbalance by first breaking down
the false confession critique of prevailing interrogation tactics and
then, using the evidentiary and reliability arguments outlined Part III,
providing a defense of interrogation tactics.
Although Part III discusses the empirical data used by false
confession theorists, it is helpful for this discussion to reemphasize
that false confessions are rare, a fact that has been lost on those who
call for fundamental changes to our investigative procedures in order
to prevent their occurrence. Whether "such occurrences are rare tra-
gedies or a widespread epidemic" should condition any response; 252
the more uncommon these miscarriages of justice are, the more ca-
bined our response should be. If a certain interrogative system is
producing X amount of confessions per year, of which Y percent are
true confessions, then we should focus on smaller changes that ad-
dress the Z percent of false confessions that result from an otherwise
efficient system.
In the first place, protections against egregious police mani-
pulation already exist. For example, in Spano v. New York, the Su-
preme Court ruled that a confession was involuntary in part because
the interrogator was a childhood friend who falsely led the defendant
to believe that he would face familial and financial problems if he did
not confess.253 The deception, however, was considered as part of a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis, and was not, in itself, dispo-
sitive of the inquiry.254 In addition to this deception, the Court noted
the defendant's emotional instability, his physical fatigue during the
interrogation, the length of the interrogation, his relative lack of edu-
251 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 185, at 1136-38.
252 Magid, supra note 55, at 1172.
253 Spano, 360 U.S. at 323-24.
254 Id. at 321, 323.
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cation, and his requests for an attorney and to remain silent.255 The
Court again had to deal with police deception in Frazier v. Cupp, 256
where the police exaggerated the strength of their case against the
suspect by telling him that this cousin, who was also a suspect, had
confessed for the both of them.257 Once more the Court found the de-
ception relevant to, but not dispositive of, the inquiry of reliability.
However, in Moran v. Burbine the Court explicitly found that some
deceptive tactics are so "egregious" that they violate due process.258
In the same breath, the Court went to great lengths to emphasize so-
ciety's interest in gamering confessions and the effectiveness of po-
lice interrogations to do so. 25 9 These cases illustrate two things: first,
that police interrogators must respect certain boundaries when ques-
tioning suspects; and second, that when those boundaries are crossed,
defendants have the ability to suppress whatever statements they may
have made to the police.
Critics of deceptive police interrogation erroneously argue
that it violates the spirit of Miranda, a decision that forbids coercion,
not strategic deception. 260 Miranda cannot offer any protection from
these deceptive practices if they occur after a suspect has validly
waived his Miranda rights. Since the critics can rarely claim that
these tactics violate Miranda, they have no choice but to couch their
arguments in terms of trust and dignity, while pointing out the
asymmetries in power between the interrogator and the suspect.261
Upon closer inspection, these arguments cannot justify a complete
overhaul of police interrogation.
Critiques that focus on the power asymmetry between the in-
terrogator and the suspect might be labeled as the "fox-hunter" ratio-
255 Id. at 321-24.
256 394 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1969).
257 id
258 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986).
29 Id. at 426-28.
260 Magid, supra note 55, at 1176-77; see also Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 749,
752 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing police to fabricate fingerprint and DNA evidence in order
to procure a confession).
261 See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 15, 40-41 (1981) (describing the uneven effects of police deception when
comparing experienced criminals against inexperienced ones); Gerald Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1442 (1985) (arguing that relatively disadvantaged sus-
pects should not suffer more than their advantaged counterparts).
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nale for limiting police interrogations.262 Where the suspect is the
fox and the interrogator is the hunter, the fox should be given a head
start to ensure a reasonable chance to survive-or in this case, the
criminal must be given a reasonable opportunity to get away without
incriminating himself. This argument amounts to a critique of effec-
tiveness: modem interrogations are so effective at eliciting confes-
sions that the field must be balanced in some way.263 While this view
might make sense in the sport of hunting, when justice is our end, it
should not sway any minds.264
Other critiques focus on certain vulnerabilities of particular
defendants in comparison to seasoned or sophisticated suspects who
can withstand the "inherent pressure" of a police interrogation.265
This critique amounts to an expansive view of equal protection,
where foolish and ignorant suspects are given the same chance to es-
cape an interrogation unscathed as sophisticated suspects.266 At first
blush, this is a valid concern. Often interrogators use the same de-
ceptive tactics on children and the mentally retarded as they would
on normal, emotionally stable adults.267 To be sure, especially vul-
nerable suspects such as young children and the mentally infirm
should be spared from the use of flagrantly deceptive tactics during
an interrogation. However, those who might embrace this criticism
as a policy reform should be warned about its steep diminishing re-
turns once the policy is expanded beyond children and the mentally
ill.
Neither the Due Process Clause nor any other part of the Con-
stitution should provide cover for foolish criminals who not only
break the law, but also confess to their crime. Once expanded, the
principle of treating suspects differently based on particular vulnera-
262 Magid, supra note 55, at 1179-80.
263 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 702 (1988) (advocating
the exclusion of all confessions garnered during interrogations).
264 Joseph D. Grano, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 29 (1993); but see George E.
Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, I
WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 285 (1975) (making the case for the fox-hunter limit on interrogation so
that confessors self-incriminate only after making a calculated and informed decision to do
so).
265 Magid, supra note 262, at 1180-81.
266 id.
267 Leo, supra note 19, at 231-34.
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bilities can get tricky very quickly. 268 It is rather tautological that so-
ciety benefits when guilty persons confess. 269 Therefore, the notion
that there should be a disparate impact analysis conducted for those
suspects with slightly below average IQs in comparison to those sus-
pects with exceptionally high IQs runs the risk of sullying an other-
wise valid system of interrogation. The Constitution does not
mandate that interrogators cater their tactics to each suspect's overt
strengths and weaknesses. Even putting aside the logistical impossi-
bility of doing so, a suspect's foolishness should never be used as a
justification to increase the constitutional protections afforded to
him.270 That smart criminals can withstand an interrogation better
than foolish ones is consistent with their tendency to leave less evi-
dence and to be more discrete.271 Yet no one would argue that crime
scene investigators should be any less thorough if they know they are
dealing with a particularly sloppy criminal.272
Others have criticized police interrogation for relying on fa-
bricated trust relationships, which ultimately give the suspect a false
sense of security in order to influence his decision calculus about
whether or not to confess.273 This argument holds that police interro-
gations involve two inherent contradictions. First, although a confes-
sion must be voluntary in order to be admissible in court, modem in-
terrogation methods invariably produce involuntary confessions,
because if the process works as it is designed, "[the] suspect [is
caused] to perceive that he has no choice but to comply," meaning
268 See George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 807, 811-12 (1995) (arguing that the fox-hunter view, if introduced, would
run contrary to the structure of our criminal justice system).
269 See Columbe, 367 U.S. at 576-81 (describing the difficulties of obtaining a conviction
absent a confession).
270 Magid, supra note 55, at 1181 (arguing that the Constitution "surely does not protect
the foolish and unsophisticated criminal from himself'); see also Joseph D. Grano, supra
note 264, at 32 (arguing against giving guilty suspects a fair chance at acquittal).
271 Caplan, supra note 261, at 1456-57 (noting that inexperienced suspects fare worse than
experienced ones because they do not know or assert their rights); Greenawalt, supra note
261, at 40-41 (observing that investigations and interrogations have an "uneven" impact on
inexperienced criminals); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 865, 872 (1981).
272 See Magid, supra note 55, at 1180 (observing that society benefits when the prosecu-
tion has a strong case, and that "DNA, fingerprint, and videotape evidence can be even more
damning than a confession").
273 See id. at 1176-77 (noting that deceptive interrogation tactics are often used and even
encouraged); Soree, supra note 9, at 199-201 (detailing various controversial techniques
used by interrogators that include role-playing and misrepresenting their identities).
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that his statements cannot, by definition, be strictly voluntary.274 Ad-
ditionally, since confessing to a crime is almost never in someone's
best interest, police interrogators must elicit a suspect's trust and then
manipulate the suspect into embracing the irrational by incriminating
himself.275 By not telling a suspect that, in reality, it is in their best
interest not to confess, this critique claims that interrogators violate
sacred notions of trust, which should then taint the resultant confes-
sion.276 However, a principle that forbids violations of "trust" be-
tween law enforcement and suspects would then forbid countless
other police tactics, including undercover investigations, which also
rely on manufactured relationships of trust. 2 77 According to this ar-
gument, another standard and relatively benign interrogation practice,
building rapport with the suspect by making small talk before asking
substantive questions, is a fraudulent attempt to "soften[] up the sus-
pect." 278 Moreover, the same principles that would justify strict lim-
its on, or complete prohibitions of, police deception during interroga-
tions would also justify eliminating other deceptive tactics such as
wiretapping and the use of informants.279 It is therefore unsurprising
that courts rarely give constitutional import to critiques of police de-
ception. Unless a proactive suspect approaches the police himself
and offers the confession, arguments like these can be used to color
any statement, no matter the police tactic used, as unreliable. As a
result, the critics have instead tried to prove a causal link between
deceptive police interrogations and false confessions.
These commentators, however, might assume too much about
a particular confessor's interests. Often police interrogators, who
convince guilty persons that it is better to face up to their crimes ra-
ther than maintain their innocence, have considerable leverage over
the suspect such as an accumulation of evidence, a ready lineup of
persons prepared to testify should the matter proceed to trial, and the
274 Leo, supra note 14, at 9.
275 See id. at 8-9; see also DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETs 213
(1991) (calling the notion that it is in a suspect's interest to confess both fraudulent and fic-
tional).
276 William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903,
1926 (1993) ("If suspects fully comprehended the nature and scope of their legal rights and
the likely consequences of relinquishing them, there would be very few police station con-
fessions.").
277 See Magid, supra note 55, at 1182.
278 Leo, supra note 19, at 121-22.
279 Magid, supra note 55, at 1186.
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guilty suspect's own calculus that if the matter were to go to trial he
would be found guilty.280 Nevertheless, many critics still conclude
that nothing short of "overhauling American interrogation as it is pre-
sently practiced" will cure society of this ill. 281
However, the false confession theorists' near unanimous call
for a complete overhaul of police interrogation tactics is, at times, in-
consistent.282 For example, one false confessions scholar spends a
considerable amount of time explaining how an innocent person will
experience anxiety when confronted with allegations of a crime he
did not commit, but then describes how a guilty person feels the same
anxiety. 283 This anxiety may lead to a false confession, or it might
not.284 Another scholar objects when police officers build a rapport
by being friendly with suspects, but also objects when those same of-
ficers are "outwardly aggressive." 285  While critiquing the inherent
injustices of police interrogations, these commentators also credit the
system for its ability to garner confessions, since virtually all confes-
sions result from an interrogation.286 In fact, truthful confessions are
the result of the very interrogative pressure that they assert is a nor-
matively bad aspect of the criminal justice system, namely: the con-
fessor's desire to stop the interrogation and escape from the stresses
involved; the perception that confessing is his only option; and final-
ly, the calculus that the benefits of confessing outweighs the costs of
a false denial.287 If these tactics produce both truthful and false con-
fessions, an empirical and measurable percentage comparing each
280 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that suspects may calculate that confessing is in their best interest because "it advances the
goals of both 'justice and rehabilitation' ").
281 Leo, supra note 19, at 120; see generally Alschuler, supra note 248 (discussing the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent); Dripps, supra note 263
(discussing the reform of confession laws, the effects of police interrogation, and the right to
remain silent).
282 See White, supra note 38, at 118-20 (explaining that the interrogation process can pro-
duce anxiety, causing innocent and guilty suspects to confess).
283 White, supra note 38, at 118-120.
284 Id. at 120 ("But even if a suspect experiences considerable anxiety as [a] result of the
interrogation process, it does not follow that he will be likely to confess to a crime he did not
commit.").
285 Leo, supra note 19, at 132-33.
286 Id. at 162 ("Why do suspects confess? The short answer, of course, is police interroga-
tion, since suspects almost never confess spontaneously. . .
287 id
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would be useful before a system overhaul is proposed.288
To aid in the detection of false confessions, false confession
theorists describe a sequence of errors during routine police interro-
gations that can produce false confessions. First, investigators must
[M]isclassify an innocent person as guilty; they next
subject him to a guilt-presumptive, accusatory interro-
gation; and once they have elicited a false admission,
they pressure the suspect to provide a postadmission
narrative that they actively shape, often supplying the
suspect with the (public and nonpublic) facts of the
289crime.
The first step assumes the conclusion in a rather tautological
way: for a person to confess falsely, he must be innocent. Unfortu-
nately, lines are not drawn so easily, and if the question of innocence
were that clear, it is highly unlikely the confession would be sought
in the first place, and even less likely that the case would proceed to
trial.
The second step-an accusatory interrogation-is simply not
unique to innocent persons, for it is also the technique used with
great success against guilty suspects. 290 This is a crucial observation
because it leads one to question the link between wrongful convic-
tions and accusatory interrogations. Indeed, if an accusatory interro-
gation is standard procedure, and as such may lead to no confession,
a true confession, or (rarely) a false confession, the theory's link to
the lattermost becomes tenuous at best. The causality argument im-
plicit in this critique-that accusatory interrogations create false con-
fessions-is considerably weak given the relatively few false confes-
sions this tactic produces in comparison to the other two outcomes:
the production of either no confession or a truthful confession.29'
The third sequence commits the error of relying too heavily
upon the post-admission narrative. A careful and important distinc-
tion should be drawn between a false confession and an untrustwor-
288 See infra Part II.
289 Leo, supra note 19, at 198.
290 White, supra note 26, at 111 (conceding that an accusatorial interrogation is "indis-
pensable to law enforcement").
291 See supra Part III.A-C.
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thy confession.2 92 The former is characterized by inconsistencies be-
tween the facts of the case and the confessionary statements made to
law enforcement. The latter is defined as a confession that is ob-
tained under circumstances that raise significant doubt as to its accu-
racy, whether or not the particular confession appears to be accurate
on face.293 Many theorists are too quick to label a confession that is
not entirely consistent with the facts, or extracted under stressful
conditions, as false.294 A better paradigm would create a middle
ground where post-admission inconsistencies may suggest a certain
degree of untrustworthiness, at least as applied to certain aspects of
the confession, but not necessarily falsity of the entire inculpation.
Introducing evidence or testimony that a confession is untrustworthy
rather than false, may be a reasonable way for the defense to counter
a prosecution's presentation of a defendant's confession. Such color-
ing by the defense can be particularly powerful in those cases where
the prosecutor is relying almost entirely on the confession to secure a
conviction.295
An interrogator's belief that a particular suspect is guilty is
generally based upon objective factors, and therefore, police are right
far more often than they are wrong, and a confession is true far more
often than it is false, regardless of the means used to induce it.296 The
rarity of false confessions should correspondingly temper the calls to
overhaul our justice system.
In the absence of unusual circumstances, however, an
innocent person would not rationally believe that the
police would be able to convict him of a crime he did
not commit. Thus, an innocent suspect merely sub-
jected to ordinary interrogation techniques . . . would
appear unlikely to conclude that the benefits of reliev-
ing anxiety by confession outweigh the detriments of
297
admitting to a crime.
Nevertheless, one critic laments that modem interrogation's
292 White, supra note 26, at 108.
293 Id. at 109.
294 See, e.g., Agar, supra note 93, at 42.
295 Warren, 635 P2d at 1243-44.
296 Id. at 1240.
297 White, supra note 38, at 120.
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genius makes the irrational-admitting to a crime that will likely lead
to punishment-appear rational. 298 To the extent that this method is
far more likely to persuade a guilty party, rather than an innocent par-
ty, to embrace the irrational by confessing to his crime, it has been a
remarkable coup for law enforcement. While that is not to say the
system is perfect, it is unquestionably a long way from total failure,
and certainly does not need a complete overhaul. The societal bene-
fits of garnering confessions, combined with the overall effectiveness
of police interrogation, are enough to reject the false confessionists'
critiques. Until more empirical research is done that can accurately
measure the frequency of false confessions, lawmakers and judges
should resist extreme demands to reform the system.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the phenomenon of false confessions is
real. Scholars and researchers have worked tirelessly for decades to
uncover incidents of wrongful convictions based upon false confes-
sions. 299 Fortunately, the limited data available indicates that false
confessions are extraordinarily rare.oo Moreover, as a result of this
infrequency, the data on false confessions has been rather narrow and
superficial, which results in two problems. First, to date, no empiri-
cal data exists that demonstrates either how often false confessions
occur generally, or how often they occur when a suspect is subjected
to certain interrogation tactics. The lack of empirical evidence prec-
ludes any policy conclusions. We still do not know what police tac-
tics to change, or how to change them. Given the rarity of false con-
fessions, and the unreliability of the evidence proffered by false
confession experts, policymakers and courts should resist attempts to
overhaul the criminal justice system. Second, false confession ex-
perts have an unacceptably high rate of error when using their theory
to determine whether a particular confession is false. The experts are
no more accurate than a coin toss. These two problems raise serious
concerns about the testimony's reliability under Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. Finally, false confession expert testimony
invades the province of the jury by making the witness a human lie
298 Leo, supra note 20, at 985.
299 Id. at 981-983.
300 Cassell, supra note 195, at 530.
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detector tasked with determining the credibility of the defendant's
statements.
The exclusion of false confession expert testimony would not
leave defendants any more vulnerable to a wrongful conviction based
upon a confession extracted through the use of coercive or abusive
interrogation tactics. As mentioned above, most jurors accept the
counter-intuitive notion that innocent persons may sometimes con-
fess to crimes they did not commit. Given this recognizance, juries
can still serve as the ultimate fact finder without having their conclu-
sions drawn for them by false confession expert witnesses.301 Stra-
tegic opening and closing statements, vigorous cross-examinations,
and particularized jury instructions would help reinforce the jury's
ability to detect an untrustworthy confession without unduly tram-
pling upon the jury's role as the trier of fact. Our criminal justice
system is founded on the belief that juries can understand when
statements might be unreliable, and admitting expert testimony on
false confessions upends this fundamental pillar.
30' Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822-23.
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